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ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND PROGRESSIVE JACKPOTS:
A BETTER ANALYSIS
To the Editor:
The timing of deductions associated with progressive
slot machines is an issue that obviously won't disappear,
although worrying about casino taxation may be a peculiar way for bright people to spend their time. Lee
Sheppard's news analysis on this issue (see Tax Notes,
October 9, 1989, p. 160) is delightful, and I agree with her
ultimate conclusion: in the best of all possible worlds, a
casino should not be able to deduct amounts associated
with progressive jackpots until they are paid out. But Ms.
Sheppard purports to analyze section 461 (h), not the
ideal world, and she is on shaky ground in her statutory
analysis.

~ Ms.

Sheppard is also too quick to reject a
perfectly plausible argument Interpreting obscure statutory language.

Several years ago in this journal (see Tax Notes, September 1, 1986, p. 911) I concluded that, had section
461 (h) been in effect for the tax years involved, it would
have changed the result in United States v. Hughes
Properties, 476 U.S. 593 (1986). I came to regret that
position, not because I thought it was necessarily wrong,
but because I had given insufficient weight to the argument that economic performance occurs as gamblers
play the machines, rather than when the jackpots are
paid.' I think that Ms. Sheppard is also too quick to reject
a perfectly plausible argument interpreting obscure statutory language.
Here's how the argument runs. Hughes Properties tells
us that the all events test is met at the end of the casino's
taxable year (assuminf! the amount of the liability can
then be determined). Had there been no statutory change,
casinos could therefore have deducted each year's increase in the aggregate progressive jackpot liabilities.
However, section 461 (h), added to the Code in 1984,
attached a further requirement: a liability meeting the all
events test can be deducted no earlier than the time of
economic performance. What constitutes economic performance in the case of progressive jackpots?

•

'I pulled back a bit from my initial position in "The Supreme
Court and the Timing of Deductions for Accrual-Basis Taxpayers," 22 Ga. L. Rev. 229,255 n. 119 (1988).
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Section 461 (h)(2) lists a number of ways in which
economic performance is deemed to occur, and somehow
or other we need to fit the casino situation into statutory
language not designed to it. Ms. Sheppard does not tell
us how she concludes under the statute what economic
performance is. Ms. Sheppard uses the word "clearly"
often in her analysis, but the conclusion that economic
performance occurs upon payment of the jackpot is not
at all clear. Ms. Sheppard notes that "taxpayers cannot
write their own exceptions"; similarly, she cannot write
her own statute. In most cases under section 461 (h)(2),
economic performance is not payment, but some other
event or series of events.
What else could economic performance be? Section
461 (h)(2)(B) states that, in the case of services and property provided by the taxpayer, "economic performance
occurs as the taxpayer provides such property or services." One of Ms. Sheppard's interviewees asked, "What
does entertainment have to do with timing of deductions?"
The answer to that question is obvious-under the statute. If providing entertainment constitutes the provision
of services and gamblers are entertained· by merely
playing slot machines provided by a casino, economic
performance occurs as the machines are played. That
analysis is not mandated by the statutory languagethere are a lot of its involved-but neither is it an off-thewall argument. For better or for worse, statutes do not
always lead to the conceptually best results.
Ms. Sheppard uses the recurring items exception of
section 461 (h)(3) to bolster her case that economic
performance occurs at the time of payment, but her
presentation is misleading at best. That exception permits
treating a liability associated with certain "recurring
items" as incurred in a particular taxable year even
though economic performance has not yet occurred. For
the exception to apply, a number of tests must be met,
including a requirement that economic performance in
fact occurs within the shorter of a reasonable period or
8.5 months after the close of the taxable year. Ms.
Sheppard concludes that "there is a reason for the 8.5
month rule. Congress clearly [that word again!] did not
want deductions accelerated more than that limit."
Saying something is clear doesn't make it so. If Congress had wanted Ms. Sheppard's "8.5 month rule," it
could have written the rule into the basic definition of
economk performance, rather than into an exceptionan exception that comes into play only when the economic performance requirement has not otherwise been
met. Indeed, for nonrecurring items, it is conceivable
that, even with section 461 (h) on the books, deductions
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LETTERS TO THE EDITOR
can be accelerated far beyond 8.5 months (e.g., if th~ all
events test and economic performance are met long
before the taxpayer must make payment on the liability).
Ms: Sileppard's recurring items ariaiysis is flawed because it assumes its conclusion. She is right that "not all
casino operators caw guarantee that the· progressive
jackpots will be paid within 8.5 months after the close of
the taxable year in which they would be deducted," but
that fact is important only if payment constitutes economic performance. If economic performance occurs as
the machines are played, we have no reason to be
concerned about the recurring items exception.

When doubt remains about the time Qf economic performance after legitimate attempts
have been made to apply those definitions,. the
deduction should be deferred until paymeni.

"recurring items" easily meet one of the definitions of
economic performance in section 461 (h)(2), without regard to the recurring items exception, and that is the
argument of the casino lawyers and accountants.
None of this is to say that Ms. Sheppard's result is
wrong, only that the issue is· not nearly so clear as she
makes it out to be. (An aside: Is this clearly a s13ction
461 (h) issue? Maybe we should be considering timing-ofincome principles rather than those governing timing of
deductions.) I prefer an analysis as follows: The progressive jackpot situation does not fit easily within any of the
statutory definitions of economic performance. When
doubt remains ?bout th~ttime of economic performance
after legitimate attempts.have been made to apply those
definitions, the deduction should be deferred until payment. in other words, when in doubt; defer. That governing principle has several virtues, including its closer
relationship to the language of section 461 (h) than anything in Ms. Sheppard's analysis.
Very truly yours,

One passage in Ms. Sheppard's analysis can be interpreted to mean that "recurring items," as that term would
be understood iri a common sense way, must always be
examined under section 461 (h)(3). I'm not sure she
meant to say that. In any case; it's not true. Many

Erik M. Jensen
Professor of Law
Case Western Reserve
University
Cleveland, Ohio
October 12, 1989
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To the Editor:
I was deeply inspired by the letter to an unidentified
senator by Mr. Ike N. O'Ciast that explainedwhy a capital
gains cut is good for the country. (See Tax Notes, October 9, 1989, p. 244.) Indeed, I was so. inspired that I
wanted to add my own, of course humble, contribution.
(One cannot but be humble in the face of such preceding
eloquence.)
_ .
In my view, the House bill lowering the capital gains
rate for two years was a brilliant piece of legislation that
has taken a lot of unfair criticism. It should have a place
in our hearts for years to come whether or not it passes.
Unfortunately, people simply don't seem to understand
its massively positive effects on efficiency.
As we learned in 1986, differential tax rates are inefficient. But given the short-term nature of the rate reduction
in the House bill, it is unlikely to harm efficiency. Two
years is simply too short a period for people to plan on
capital gains from new investments. Thus, the provision
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is simply a windfall to a handful of lucky taxpayers,
without negative efficiency consequences. This, in turn,
is wonderful for the most important type of efficiency:
efficient fund-raising by members of Congress who realize
that their constituents are too lazy or ungrateful to make
appropriate campaign contributions in the absence of tax
incentives.
Moreover, the House bill maximizes revenue-raising
efficiency. It is widely believed that changing the capital
gains rate raises revenue whether the rate goes up or
down. When the rate goes down, pent-up demand is
released. When the rate goes up, the increase is preceded
by a rush to market.
The House bill is wonderful in that it both lowers and
raises the rate. But it is here, alas, that the bill does not go
quite far enough. The ideal proposal would be one in
which rates were raised and lowered again and again. For
example, Congress could establish
capital gains rate
lottery. Every two years, a new capital gains rate would
be picked by random drawing. The rate could be any
integer between, say, five and fifty percent (although
there is admittedly a certain elegance to picking nonintegers such as 19.6 percent). The new rate would be
effective six months after it was announced, giving plenty
of time for the rush .to market in the event of a rate
increase.
I estimate that this proposal would raise literally billions
of tax dollars. On the other hand, perhaps it is not that far
from the system we already have.

a

Mack A. Damia
Honolulu, Hawaii
October 16, 1989
TAX NOTES, October 30, 1989

